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Abstract in Dutch
Dit document beschrijft de arbeidsmarktextensie voor het algemeen-evenwichtsmodel
‘WorldScan’. In de arbeidsmarktmodule is het arbeidsaanbod in twee opzichten endogeen: de
participatie en het aantal gewerkte uren. Onvrijwillige werkloosheid wordt meegenomen in de
vorm van een model van collectieve loononderhandelingen (‘right to manage approach’). In dit
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werkwijze van de module wordt met illustratieve simulaties gedemonstreerd. Deze kunnen in de
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6Preface
Government policies may affect labour market participation and involuntary unemployment. To
be able to assess these policy impacts with the Computable General Equilibrium model
WorldScan a labour market extension of the model was required. This extension is described in
this document. The labour market module features endogenous labour supply at two margins:
participation and hours of work. Involuntary unemployment is captured through a collective
bargaining (“right to manage”) set-up. The authors explain how these two labour market
mechanisms interact and how they are calibrated to empirical elasticities. Selected policy
simulations illustrate the working mechanisms of the module.
This work has been ﬁnanced under the speciﬁc targeted research project “MODELS” in
Framework Program 6 of the European Union (see http://www.ecmodels.eu/). The authors had
helpful discussions with a number of people at CPB and express their thanks to Peter Broer, Rob




We present a labour market module for WorldScan in which labour supply and unemployment
are endogenous variables, not exogenous parameters, which they were in the previous set-up.
Labour supply at the intensive margin (hours of work) results from the optimising
consumption-leisure choice of a representative household. Labour supply at the extensive
margin (participation) is modelled as the comparison of the expected utility of participation with
a ﬁxed cost of taking up work, which varies between households. Wages and unemployment are
determined through collective bargaining between ﬁrms and a trade union in a representative
sector of each economy.
These modelling choices produce interaction effects, which are integrated in the model as far
as possible. Labour supply at the two margins has different consequences for unemployment:
Without labour demand reactions, an additional participating worker increases unemployment,
whereas an additional hour of an already participating worker does not. Unemployment, in turn,
affects labour supply at the extensive margin, because the households consider the expected
value of participation in their decision and high unemployment rates have a discouraging effect.
Finally, bargained wages feed back to the individual hours-of-work decision, which then
co-determines employment in persons.
Interaction effects turn out to be intricate and are not always resolved in a completely
consistent way in WorldScan. Most prominently, the empirical parameters of the Linear
Expenditure System are not in all cases compatible with empirical wage differentials and
replacement rates. Second, there remains a ambiguity between personal and functional income
distribution in the disaggregated household accounting. And ﬁnally, the wage bargaining
equation is not calibrated to empirical wage curve elasticities. However, we think that these
weak points of the current set-up are not dominant as drivers of the model’s basic reactions to
policy shocks. Nevertheless, they must be kept in mind when interpreting the simulation results.
9101 Policy analysis with WorldScan
The applied general equilibrium model WorldScan is used for assessing the consequences of a
broad spectrum of European policy measures, e.g. liberalisation of trade in services (De Bruijn
et al., 2008), R&D stimulation (Gelauff and Lejour, 2006) or greenhouse gas emission trading in
the context of the Kyoto protocol (Boeters et al., 2007). While the modelling of international
trade, sectoral interdependencies and consumption demand can be considered state of the art in
applied general equilibrium modelling, labour market mechanisms have received less attention.
This can be defended as long as one is primarily interested in the consequences for the
international trade structure, productivity growth or the carbon price. However, once we start to
engage in an encompassing impact assessment of policy measures, the labour market is a core
issue, particularly in those European countries where involuntary unemployment remains one of
the most pressing economic problems.
In the context of the Framework 6 project “MODELS”, the labour market representation in
WorldScan has therefore undergone a thorough revision. The most important outcome is that
labour supply and involuntary unemployment have turned from exogenous parameters into
endogenous variables. This paper documents the changes that were necessary to implement this
general strategy. It covers both the core equations for labour supply and unemployment and a
number of auxiliary reﬁnements of the model structure.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 sketches our point of departure, the labour market set-up of
WorldScan in the version documented by Lejour et al. (2006). Section 3 lays out the general
modelling principles for the new labour market representation. These are explained in more
detail in Sections 4, 5 (labour supply) and 6 (collective wage bargaining and unemployment).
We document auxiliary changes in the model set-up (Sections 7 and 8) and remaining problems
(Section 9). Section 10 presents a series of illustrative simulations of an energy tax reform with
different tax revenue recycling schemes. Section 11 draws conclusions about the applicability of
the labour-market-extended model.
11122 Previous labour market set-up
Our point of departure is the labour market module of WorldScan as documented in Chapter 4
(p. 39 – 52) of Lejour et al. (2006). In this set-up, the labour market behaviour is almost
completely determined by exogenous parameters. Essentially, we have a single labour market
equation per skill group (low skilled / high skilled) and region:
LD(Y;p) = (1  ¯ u)¯ LS; (2.1)
where LD is labour demand (as a function of the vectors of sectoral outputs, Y; and prices, p;
including wages), u is unemployment, and LS is labour supply. Labour supply and
unemployment are determined outside the model, indicated by bars above the variables in
equation (2.1), through the following steps.
• Labour supply (in persons) per region is given as an exogenous projection. This projection has
been calculated by decomposing total population into age groups and applying age-group
speciﬁc participation rates, yielding the average participation rate of the population. Both total
population and participation rates can be varied exogenously as a part of a scenario (e.g.
simulating the effects of increasing participation of certain groups of the population). However,
they do not respond endogenously to variations in other parameters (productivity, tax rates).
Working time per person is assumed to be constant, so that labour supply in persons translates
into labour supply in hours by simple scaling.
• The same approach is taken for the split of total labour supply into low and high skilled workers.
The split is governed by a share parameter derived from GTAP and additional ILO data. This
parameter can be exogenously varied, if we want to analyse the consequences of more schooling
in a speciﬁc region, but it does not adjust endogenously to other changes in the model. The
approach of an exogenous variation of labour market parameters has been followed in Jacobs
(2005).
• Finally, also involuntary unemployment (in contrast to non-participation, which is assumed to be
voluntary) enters the model through an exogenous parameter. Unemployment rates are taken
from OECD sources and held ﬁxed both over time and in the scenario analyses. (The split
between high and low skilled unemployment is ad hoc in a way that the low skilled
unemployment rate is considerably higher.)
Under these assumptions, the wage forming mechanism is basically a competitive labour market
with ﬁxed labour supply. Total employment does not depend on the model mechanisms and can
simply be calculated as exogenous labour supply less exogenous unemployment. In the model,
the wage endogenously adjusts so that labour demand equals employment and the labour market
clears.
13This previous labour market set-up in WorldScan has obvious shortcomings, which we can
classify with regard to the type of policy that we want to analyse:
• If we analyse non-labour market policies (e.g. stimulation of R&D, an emission-trading system
or the liberalisation of trade), we are also interested in the endogenous adjustment of labour
market variables other than the wage: To what extent will labour supply adjust? Will changes in
labour supply smoothly be absorbed through labour demand, or will there be changes in the
unemployment rate? What are the wage reactions if the role of the wage is more complex than
simply the clearing of the labour market?
• Labour market effects become particularly important when we operate in a setting of a
revenue-neutral tax reform (e.g. analysing the consequences of recycling the revenue of an
emission tax). The most prominent candidate for a welfare-enhancing recycling of a budget
surplus are labour taxes, because here distortions are considered to be particularly high. If labour
supply is ﬁxed, however, the labour tax is completely non-distortionary, and it is not interesting
at all to analyse it as a revenue-recycling instrument.
• In the context of assessing the EU “Lisbon” targets, we might also be interested in policy
measures that are designed to directly stimulate labour supply. With the previous model set-up,
the only thing we can do is assume that the labour market stimulation is successful and trace out
the consequences of this (Gelauff and Lejour, 2006). In such an approach, neither the
instruments of labour market policy are speciﬁed, nor can the costs of labour market policy be
determined.
143 General modelling principles
In the light of the shortcomings listed at the end of the previous section, the principal aim of the
model revision undertaken in the labour market work package of the “MODELS” project is to
develop a labour market module where both labour supply and unemployment are endogenous.
Given the CGE set-up of WorldScan, the multi-country approach and the time restrictions of the
project, we opt for a modelling strategy at the level of representative households. This means
that any labour market behaviour that is at the level of speciﬁc aspects of household
heterogeneity is not covered (see the summarising discussion in Section 11). The
microeconomic foundation of the model is maintained. This means that representative
households are modelled as utility-maximising agents, and that the wage and unemployment
generating process is seen as the product of the interaction of utility-maximising agents as well.
This is necessary if we do not restrict ourselves to assessing observable outcomes at the labour
and other markets, but also want to perform a welfare analysis of policy scenarios.
Making labour supply and unemployment endogenous, in isolation, are two straightforward
exercises. There exist blueprint models that can in principle directly be implemented in any CGE
model like WorldScan. Endogenising labour supply and unemployment at the same time is more
demanding than simply “adding up” a labour supply and an unemployment module, because
interaction effects emerge:
• In a model without involuntary unemployment, basic labour market related questions can be
answered at the level of a representative household with a simple labour-leisure choice, i.e. with
a single margin of labour supply. Such a set-up compounds the reaction at the intensive margin
(hours of work) and at the extensive margin (participation). As long as each supplied unit of
labour is actually employed, the additional insights of splitting the two margins of labour supply
are limited.
The situation completely changes once there is involuntary unemployment. Now it is of utmost
importance whether, say, an additional one percent labour supply is one percent more hours of
the same number of persons, or one percent more persons with the same hours of work. Without,
or before, any adjustment of labour demand, the latter would translate into higher
unemployment, whereas the former would not. This difference is both interesting in itself (the
unemployment rate is the most important indicator of labour market inefﬁciency) and because of
its implications for the wage level (unemployment puts pressure on the wage) and the public
budget (unemployed persons receive some kind of unemployment compensation, unemployed
hours do not).
• A second aspect that makes the distinction between the two margins of labour supply relevant, is
the presence of non-proportional taxes on labour. The reactions on the two margins depend on
different tax indicators. At the intensive margin, the household compares the actual (optimal)
15situation with slightly more or slightly less hours of work. Here it is the marginal after-tax wage
that counts, and high marginal tax rates are likely to produce a particularly strong distortion. At
the extensive margin, in contrast, the household does not face a marginal, but a discrete choice:
working or not working at all. Consequently, the marginal tax rate has no particular role to play.
What counts is the after-tax income in the case of working, which is compared to the utility of
not working. This after-tax income is most directly determined by the average tax rate. The
marginal rate only plays an indirect role by inﬂuencing the hours of work conditional on a
positive participation decision, which are also one of the determinants of the after-tax income.
• While the ﬁrst point in this list was about the consequences of labour supply for unemployment,
there is also an important consequence in the other direction. In its participation decision,
households are likely to take the labour market situation into account. If involuntary
unemployment is high, searching for a job is costly and expected income is low, so that
participation is discouraged. One might also speculate about unemployment consequences for
the intensive margin of labour supply, but this is only plausible if households decide over hours
of work before the labour market uncertainty is resolved and unemployment rates differ by
labour market segment (part-time vs. full time). There is some plausibility in both, but
unemployment seems to be most important for the extensive margin; so we limit our attention to
this aspect.
In the following three sections, we work out the consequences of these general modelling
guidelines in detail. Section 4 is about the intensive margin of labour supply and its calibration
to empirical labour supply elasticities, Section 5 is the analogue for the extensive margin, and
Section 6 explains our approach to unemployment (collective wage bargaining).
164 Labour supply: hours of work
In this section, we present the hours of work choice of a representative household, where hours
of work are chosen as the result of maximising a utility function that comprises consumption of
goods and leisure. Except for some normalisations and auxiliary variables, we follow as closely
as possible the equations that are implemented in the WorldScan GAMS code. However, we
suppress skill, sector and country indices for expositional clarity. The WorldScan names of the
variables are listed in Appendix A.
Our point of departure is the extended income of the employed worker household,YE; which
includes labour earnings, wL(1 ta); non-labour income, Y0; and leisure, which is valued at the
marginal wage: w(T  L)(1 tm).
YE = w[L(1 ta)+(T  L)(1 tm)]+Y0
T is time endowment, L is hours worked. Both are expressed as multiples of labour supply in the
base year1 (¯ L = 1): w is the wage per initial hours package. ta and tm are the average and
marginal labour tax rate, respectively. Disposable extended income,YD; results if we subtract
basic consumption2, C0:
YD =YE  C0;





with gi and pc
i denoting basic consumption and price per consumption commodity category. The
spending of YD is determined by the maximisation of a CES utility function3 with leisure and


















where F is leisure,
F = T  L;





1 All variables with an upper bar denote base year values.
2 See Chapter 6 of Lejour et al. (2006) for the details of the consumption structure (Linear Expenditure System).
3 We use the “calibrated share form” of the CES function, see Rutherford (1998).
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As YD can be expressed asYD = pCCD +w(1 tm)F; we have
1 qC =
¯ w(1 ¯ tm) ¯ F
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In the following two subsections, we describe how labour supply at the intensive margin is
calibrated to empirical labour supply elasticities.
4.1 Income elasticity of labour supply
Originating from a homothetic CES function, the demand functions are homogeneous of degree




From this we can derive the income elasticity of labour supply. To be precise, we calculate the
per cent change of labour supply with respect to an exogenous variation of the non-labour
4 We use ex=ey as a shorthand for the elasticity ¶ logx=¶ logy:











































We treat hLY as a parameter that we can (approximately) observe empirically, and use it to
determine T; the (unobservable, disposable) time endowment. Solving for T; as a multiple of










For small, negative values of hLY (we consider -0.1 a reasonable value6), T > L is warranted. At
the same time, small absolute values of hLY will result in a small amount of disposable leisure.











For our preferred value of hLY =  0:1; we thus arrive at T  1:1: This may seem overly little:
only 4 hours disposable leisure in relation to a standard work week of 40 hours. In ad-hoc
speciﬁcations, one rather ﬁnds values between 1.5 and 2. However, this would lead to income
elasticities of labour supply which are far beyond what we empirically observe. This point has
forcefully been made by Ballard (2000).
In our numerical speciﬁcation, we rely on equation (4.7). We assume hLY to be uniformly
 0:1 across all regions. Differences in the calibrated disposable time endowment, T=L; are then
caused by country-speciﬁc values of basic consumption,C0; and in the tax rates, tm and ta (see
Section 7.2). Appendix B contains a list of the calibration results by country.
5 The case is not completely clear. Do we ask: What would happen to labour supply if we gave the household one percent
of its current income as an additional exogenous transfer? Or do we ask: What would happen to labour supply if we gave
the household so much additional exogenous income that, after adjustment, his income is one percent higher? – Our
reading of the empirical estimates is that the ﬁrst interpretation is more appropriate.
6 Here we follow Ballard (2000): “Based on my reading of the literature, a value of -0.1 would not be unreasonable.”
194.2 Wage elasticity of labour supply
With the time endowment determined by the income elasticity of labour supply, we proceed with
calibrating the value of the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure, using the
wage elasticity of labour supply as empirical basis. This elasticity (of labour supply with respect










where ˜ w = w(1 tm): The elasticity of leisure demand with respect to the marginal after-tax
wage can be routinely decomposed into a substitution effect and an income effect. The income






















which is our calibration equation. To get a feeling for magnitudes, we again consider the special





























This shows that the inclusion of hLY in the calibration makes the outcome for s more volatile.
With an exogenous, relatively large T=L ratio, a small value of hLw would have warranted a small
7 This is also what you obtain in Rutherford (1998) if you leave out the upper nest with the consumption-savings decision
(assuming that the savings ratio is zero).
20deviation of s from one.8 With hLY additionally appearing in the equation, s can easily assume
much higher values. Our preferred elasticity values, hLw = 0:1 and hLY =  0:1; produce s = 2:
Alternatively, it would be possible to calibrate the model with the compensated and the
uncompensated elasticity of labour supply. Ballard and Fullerton (1992) use values of 0.2 and 0
for their benchmark calibration.
In our numerical speciﬁcation, we use (4.9). hLw = 0:1 is assumed uniformly for all
countries. Country differences in s are produced through differences in the calibrated time
endowment, T, and the tax rates, tm and ta; which both directly appear in (4.9) and indirectly
through qC (calculated according to (4.1)). The numerical outcome of the calibration by region
can be found in Appendix B.
8 We follow Sørensen (1999) and assume a value of 0.1 for hLw: The meta study of Evers et al. (2005) suggests a
somewhat higher elasticity, but it is difﬁcult to distil a “core” value from this study.
21225 Labour supply: participation
Households are assumed homogeneous with respect to their labour-leisure choice (intensive
margin of labour supply), but they differ with respect to their participation decision. This is
caused by heterogeneity in their ﬁxed cost of taking up work, which produces the split between
participating and non-participating individuals (extensive margin of labour supply). Those with
low ﬁxed costs enter the labour market, whereas those with high ﬁxed costs stay at home.9 We
do not try to specify the precise nature of these “ﬁxed costs”. They may consist of costs that are
caused by the difﬁculties of family coordination if both partners have a paid job, commuting
costs between home and work, or simply some kind of “labour market attachment”, an inherent
utility from interacting with others in a productive environment.
The two step labour-supply decision (participation, hours of work) is solved backwards: First
the individuals determine the optimal choice of hours assuming that they participate, then they
compare this optimal outcome with the ﬁxed cost of working. Things become slightly more
complicated through the presence of involuntary unemployment. We assume that individuals
take the (unemployment-weighted) expected utility of supplying labour for comparison with
their respective ﬁxed costs. A straightforward calculation of utility in the case of unemployment



















where disposable consumption in the case of unemployment,Cu
D; is income less basic income
Cu
D =Yu = rwL(1 ta)+Yu
0  C0:
Here we assume that unemployment beneﬁts are a ﬁxed replacement rate, r, times the after-tax
income of the employed workers. The straightforward formulation (5.1), however, produces a
problem. All relevant variables for this equation are ﬁxed, either institutionally (r;ta) or through
the calibration of the labour supply decision of the employed workers (qC;s;T). For a
reasonable unemployment model, we must haveUu <Ue; which is not automatically warranted.
In fact, for some WorldScan regions,Uu turns out to be larger thanUe: Various factors play a
role here: As an outcome of the calibration (see Sections 4.1 and 4.2), ¯ F is only a small share of
T; and the elasticity of substitution, s; is considerably larger than one. This both works in the
direction of a high utility level of the unemployed. On the other hand, we have basic
consumption,C0; which makes the relative difference betweenCu
D and ¯ CD larger than simply
given by the replacement rate. However, for those countries with the highest replacement rates
(France, Germany, Great Britain, Sweden), we nevertheless end up with a “utility reversal”.
9 See Kleven and Kreiner (2006) for a general discussion of this approach.
23Finding a solution to this problem would require further explorations in the value of involuntarily
unemployed time, which seems to be an unresolved question in labour economics.10 The model
can in principle easily be adjusted to allow for more ﬂexibility. As it stands, the parameters of
the utility function have been calibrated locally at the point where the employed workers supply
labour. However, there are no strong reasons to assume that the outcome of the calibration is also
informative about the utility difference between two distant points,Ue  Uu: We approach the
problem of the previous paragraph in an ad-hoc fashion by introducing an additional parameter.
This parameter allows for the possibility that unemployed cannot consume their total time
endowment, T; as leisure. We can think of different reasons for this: Searching for a job requires
time, even more so if the unemployed are expected to attend active labour market measures. A
correction factor for disposable leisure could also capture effects of the social embeddedness that
the work sphere supplies. However, it is particularly difﬁcult to quantify this effect.11 Our
ad-hoc approach consists in the assumption that a given fraction d of the additional non-working



















Our default choice for d is d = 0:5: Obviously, this is an important candidate for sensitivity
analysis.
Given Uu; including the implied difﬁculties, we can calculate the expected utility of
supplying labour,Ul;
Ul = (1 u)Ue +uUu;
which is the same for all individuals. They compare it with their idiosyncratic ﬁxed cost of
supplying labour,U0, and supply labour if Ul >U0:
The distribution of theU0’s over the population must be calibrated. We have the actual
participation rate and the elasticity of labour supply at the extensive margin as our empirical
basis. This is sufﬁcient to calibrate the distribution of the ﬁxed costs locally (at the point of
actual participation), but not globally. The rest of the distribution must be ﬁxed by some
functional assumption. We assume that ﬁxed costs are uniformly distributed betweenU 
0 and
U+
0 : For ﬁxing the values of these bounds, we ﬁrst have to calculate the change inUl produced
by an exogenous variation in the wage. We consider an isolated change in the wage of an
employed individual. In this case, the unemployment rate and the utility in case of
10 Jenkins and Montmarquette (1979) is a coarse trial to ﬁnd indirect ways for evaluating unemployed time.
11 A possible line of investigation would be whether there are time-use studies that inform us about how much time the
unemployed actually spend on searching.

































The elasticity of labour supply at the extensive margin (N is the number of participating persons)

















This is evaluated at the initial point, with hNw set to 0.2, following Kleven and Kreiner (2006).14
h is then treated as a constant in the counterfactual simulations. This means that the elasticity at
the extensive margin is precisely reproduced only for the initial point; off the initial situation, it
is endogenous.
The bounds of the uniform distribution for h can be determined as
U 




0 = ¯ Ul +
N0  ¯ N
h
where N0 is the total population and ¯ N is initial participation.15 Finally, counterfactual
participation can be calculated as
N = ¯ N+h(Ul   ¯ Ul) (5.3)
12 This would not be the case for a general change in the wage, which applies to all individuals.
13 Again (compare Footnote 5), the interpretation of empirical estimates is not without problems. Usually, in labour supply
studies, the reaction of labour supply on the net wage is estimated, and the net wage is, in turn, calculated as the net
labour income divided by the hours of work, i.e. the average after-tax wage. This would require a correction for the degree
of tax progressivity.
14 Kleven and Kreiner (2006, p.18-20) survey the current state of empirical evidence on the elasticity at the extensive
margin. It is particularly difﬁcult to calibrate a model with a representative agent to these elasticities, because they differ
considerably by household type. The value of 0.2 is the aggregate average in Kleven and Kreiner’s core scenario.
15 As a matter of practical convenience,U 
0 and U+
0 are not implemented in the model code. Given that the labour supply
elasticity at the extensive margin is small, the bounds are almost certainly not relevant for actual policy simulations (see
Table B.6 in Appendix B).
25266 Collective wage bargaining
Involuntary unemployment in WorldScan is based on a model of collective wage bargaining
between an employers’ organisation and a representative trade union. The parties bargain over
the skill-speciﬁc hourly wage. Once the wage is ﬁxed, individuals choose optimal hours of work
and ﬁrms choose the number of employed persons, given the wage and individual hours (“Right
to manage model”).16
An alternative set-up would have been that collective bargaining is not over wages alone, but
also about hours of work (as in Sørensen, 1999). However, this would have produced
considerably more complicated bargaining equations if combined with the CES utility functions
in our approach. Sørensen (1999) uses an additively separable utility function instead. In this
case, the quantitative discrepancy between bargaining over the wage only and bargaining over
both wages and hours is small. If hours of work were subject to collective bargaining as well, we
would end up with actual hours being less than individually desired hours. This also would
complicate the calibration of the labour supply elasticities, because then the employed
households are quantity restricted as well.
Wage formation is conceptualised as the maximisation of a Nash function, W; where trade
unions are represented by a utility mark-up over the fallback option,Ue   ¯ Ul and ﬁrms by proﬁts,
p: The relative bargaining power of the trade union, l; is an unobservable parameter to be
determined in the calibration. Bargaining takes place separately for both skill groups, and we
drop the skill index (as well as sector and country indices) to keep notation simple.
max
w
W = (Ue   ¯ Ul)
lp (6.1)
The fallback option of the union, ¯ Ul; is composed of possible employment in another sector
(with a probability that equals the employment rate) and unemployment (receiving
unemployment beneﬁts, see Section 5):
¯ Ul = (1 u) ¯ Ue +uUu
The fallback option is exogenous for the sectoral wage bargain, so that the ﬁrst-order condition
of the maximisation of the Nash function is given as
l
dUe=dw





Both ﬁrms and employed workers make optimal choices, conditional on the bargained wage.
This allows us to apply the envelope theorem and express the ﬁrst-order condition in terms of
16 We restrict our discussion to the options within the collective bargaining approach. Other possible mechanisms of
involuntary unemployment are efﬁciency wage and search-and-matching models (see Pissarides (1998) or Sørensen
(1999) for comparisons). Our basic reason for choosing the collective bargaining model is that it most clearly captures the

























where E is total employment, E = LN(1 u): The ﬁrst order condition thus becomes
l
qCUeL(1 tm)





l is a parameter that cannot directly be observed. Its value is determined in the calibration
through inverting (6.2) and solving for l; given the values of all the other variables in the base
year.
In deriving (6.2), we have used the assumption of a small representative sector. When the
collective parties bargain over the wage, they consider the macroeconomic variables as beyond
their control. Most importantly, this applies to the unemployment rate, u; the wage that can be
earned in other sectors (which enters ¯ Ue and therefore ¯ Ul) and the tax rates. Given the sectoral
structure of production in WorldScan, it would have been possible to model sector-speciﬁc
bargaining. However, experiments with such a set-up showed that most of the sectoral
differences are compensated in the calibration through bargaining-power parameters varying by
sector, so that no interesting sector-speciﬁc results are generated. We have therefore opted for a
set-up with a representative sector that has the characteristics of aggregate production in each
region.
The Nash bargaining equation (6.1) requires positive proﬁts for the ﬁrms to have something
to bargain over. However, in the basic version of WorldScan there is perfect competition on the
product markets and therefore proﬁts are zero. We solve this problem by an ad-hoc adjustment,
assuming that proﬁts are a ﬁxed share of the production value. This would be the outcome if we
modelled product markets as monopolistic competitive with a ﬁxed number of product varieties,
which is a set-up often found in collective bargaining models. As long as the share of proﬁts in
output value is constant, its precise level is irrelevant, because a different level of proﬁts would
be exactly compensated by an adjusted level of the bargaining-power parameter in the
calibration. We assume ad-hoc that proﬁts are 10% of output value.17
The speciﬁcation of the Nash maximand (6.1) can be characterised as an “insider model”.
The trade union cares about the mark-up of the utility of an employed worker above the fallback
17 We plan to integrate the labour market module with the imperfect competition version of WorldScan, which makes a
more consistent formulation possible. This will most probably not change the quantitative outcomes signiﬁcantly.
28option ¯ Ul; but not about the number of employed persons. A common, alternative formulation is
the utilitarian union, which would result in the Nash maximand
max
w
˜ W = [(Ue   ¯ U)N(1 u)]
l p:
There are also versions of this equation in the literature where individual utility and employment
get different weights (e.g. in MIMIC, see Graaﬂand et al., 2001, ch. 7). With such an approach,
the ﬁrst-order condition of wage bargaining would contain the elasticity of labour demand. Then
we are left with two options, again. Either we treat this elasticity as a constant, which it is under
Cobb-Douglas production. This is the approach of Sørensen (1999), who uses labour demand
elasticities from Symons and Layard (1984) for calibration. In WorldScan, the value-added nest
is almost Cobb-Douglas (CES with an elasticity of substitution close to unity), but the rest of the
production structure is not. This leaves the case unclear. Böhringer et al. (2005) work with a
formulation where the elasticity of labour demand is endogenous. However, it turns out that the
endogenous variation of the value of the labour demand elasticity are so small that it hardy
matters for the quantitative results.
If we treat the labour demand elasticity as a constant, we are back in the situation that we
already encountered several times: Different values of the labour demand elasticity are almost
perfectly compensated through the calibration of the bargaining power parameter. This is
because a trade union that puts a very high weight on employment is observationally
indistinguishable from an insider union with very low bargaining power. For this reason we
opted for the simpler insider model.
It would be desirable to calibrate the wage bargaining system to empirical estimates of the
wage curve elasticities. However, this is difﬁcult to carry out, because the exact match between
model results and empirical estimates is not easy to determine (see Section 9.3). As a ﬁrst step
for an empirical validation, we report some general equilibrium effects in Appendix C. We
simulate an isolated one percentage point increase of the average tax rate, the marginal tax rate
and the replacement rate. The tables in Appendix C report the effects of these variations on the
wage and several employment indicators.
29307 Further changes
The model changes described so far (endogenisation of labour supply and unemployment) make
a number of further model adjustments necessary and lead to additional data requirements. In
contrast to the version of Lejour et al. (2006), the household sector is disaggregated (Section
7.1), OECD data have been used as empirical basis for tax rates and labour market institutions in
the model (Section 7.2), and the value split between high and low skilled workers has been
revised using ILO and UBS data (Section 7.3).
7.1 Household sector disaggregation
In the previous set-up of WorldScan all consumptive spending was by a single representative
household. After subtracting savings from total income, the remaining consumption was
allocated to speciﬁc goods according to a Linear Expenditure System (LES). With endogenous
labour supply and unemployment, the representative household must be split up for a number of
reasons:
• There are differences between the consumption structures of high and low skilled workers,
because the wage of the low skilled is lower and, as a consequence, they have a higher share of
basic consumption.
• The same applies for employed and unemployed workers per skill group.
• Income of the unemployed is determined by applying the replacement rate to the income of the
employed. This requires both separation of the two skill groups and per capita accounting.
• Through the endogenous participation decision, the total number of workers is not constant any
more, but adjusts endogenously. The total amount of basic consumption moves in line with this.
• Government consumption has a different structure than private consumption. (This split is
available in the GTAP data, but was not used in the previous WorldScan set-up.)
• Government consumption is less than total tax revenue. The residual (most conveniently
interpreted as transfers) must be dealt with in the model.
Led by these requirements, we end up with the following structure of the household sector:
There are four worker households: high and low skilled, employed and unemployed. The
employed workers receive their wage income, the unemployed workers receive unemployment
beneﬁts.18 The four worker households consume according to the LES, where basic
consumption per commodity per capita is the same across households. The government collects
18 In the WorldScan model code, the unemployed households are split one again in those that receive wage-indexed
unemployment insurance payments and those that receive consumption-price indexed welfare beneﬁts. This split is
suppressed in the present model description.
31all tax revenue and spends money for publicly provided goods. This leaves us with two residual
income categories: capital income and transfers (which are calculated as the difference between
tax revenue and public consumption). The problem with these income categories is that we do
not know how they are distributed between the different worker households and non-working
households (except for the unemployment beneﬁts). Therefore we collect income from these
sources in a residual household account. Here we subtract savings, which are computed by
applying an econometrically estimated macro savings function (as in the previous set-up). The
remaining income is spend according to a Cobb-Douglas utility function. As we do not know the
number of persons that are represented by this residual household, we cannot apply the LES.
This modelling of the residual income categories is clearly a loose end of the current approach
(for further discussion see Section 9.2).
7.2 OECD data for calibration
The relevance of reliable tax rate information as an input for the model calibration is more
pressing than in the former set-up for two reasons. First, we now have a separate government
budget accounting, and tax revenue, together with government consumption, determines
transfers. Second, tax rates are an important factor in the determination of the wage bargaining
outcome. It has been pointed out that there are many instances of problematic tax rates in the
GTAP data set (Gurgel et al., 2007). We therefore follow Gurgel et al. (2007) in reconstructing
macroeconomic tax rates from OECD sources. In addition, we need tax rates separately for low
and high skilled workers, as well as the replacement rate and an indicator of tax progressivity. In
particular, we use the following data sources:
• Effective average tax rates on consumption, labour and capital income are constructed from
OECD “Annual National Accounts of OECD countries, Vol. 2”, Issue 2005, and OECD
“Revenue Statistics”, Issue 2004 for the GTAP base year 2001. They are calculated as proposed
in Mendoza et al. (1994) and further developed by Gurgel et al. (2007). In order to better ﬁt the
tax bases identiﬁed in the model of this paper, we have used the gross instead of the net capital
income as basis for the capital tax. This gives substantially lower capital tax rates than those
reported in the papers cited.
• Skill speciﬁc average tax rates are constructed by assuming that the relation for low and high
skilled workers corresponds to those between the household types “Single, no child, earning
67% of average production worker” and “Single, no child, earning 167% of average production
worker” in OECD “Taxing Wages”, Issue 2004. We take entry “144. Total tax wedge including
employer’s social security contributions (Average rate in %)” and rescale it, holding the ratio
constant, so that in total the average tax rate from the OECD macro sources is met.
• Skill speciﬁc marginal tax rates: Again we use OECD “Taxing Wages”, Issue 2004, “Single no
32child earning 67% (167%) of average production worker (APW)”, entries “144” and “153. Total
tax wedge: Principal earner (marginal rate in %)”. We ﬁrst calculate tax progressivity, expressed
as the “CRIP”, the coefﬁcient of residual income progression, where CRIP = (1 tm)=(1 ta):
Then tm is calculated by applying CRIP to the re-scaled value of ta:
• The replacement rates are taken from OECD “Beneﬁts and Wages”, Issue 2004, Table 3.3a. (p.
102) “Average of Net Replacement Rates over 60 months of unemployment 2001, for four
family types and two earnings levels, in per cent”, entry “without social assistance, no children,
single person”. Here, no skill-speciﬁc information is available, so we assume that the same
replacement rate applies to both skill types.19
7.3 Revision of the high/low skilled value split
Combining the value shares of high and low skilled labour in GTAP with additional information
about the number of high and low skilled workers produces an implicit ratio of high to low
skilled wages. Because the precise mechanism that led to the GTAP skill-speciﬁc value shares is
not easily recovered, it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd appropriate volume data to be combined with the GTAP
values. For volume data from independent sources, the wage ratio turns out to be unreasonable
in many cases (including cases where the low skilled are better paid than the high skilled).
These difﬁculties, and the observation that the empirical foundation of the GTAP skill shares
is relatively narrow and dated, led us to a complete revision of the skill share information in
WorldScan. Basically, the procedure is as follows: (1) We derive sectoral high-to-low skilled
worker shares from ILO statistics. (2) We take a high-to-low skilled wage ratio from UBS
statistics and assume that it is uniform across sectors. (3) From this we calculate sectoral
high-to-low skilled value ratios, which are used to split the value share of labour in GTAP. (4) By
assuming that wages of the skill groups are uniform across sectors – the only assumption that is,
although counterfactual, compatible with labour mobility across sectors –, we can calculate a
macroeconomic split of the total working population into high and low skilled.
In particular, we use the following data sources:
• Data for high-to-low ratio of employed persons are taken from: ILO, the LABORSTA internet
site, Yearly Statistics (http://laborsta.ilo.org/). We use table 1E (“Economically active
population, by industry and occupation”), and choose for each country a sample year as close as
possible to 2001. These tables show the distribution of the economically active population by
industry, cross-classiﬁed by occupation.
• Data for high-to-low skilled wage ratio are calculated form: Union Bank of Switzerland, Prices
and Earnings, A comparison of purchasing power around the globe / 2006 edition, Appendix:
19 Plausibly, the low skilled have a higher replacement rate.
33Earnings and working hours of professions. We assume the following classiﬁcation: Low skilled
are “car mechanics, building labourer, skilled industrial worker, factory worker, bus driver, cook,
personal assistant, sales assistant, call centre agent and bank credit ofﬁcer”. High skilled are
“engineers, department heads, product managers and primary school teacher”. We use
unweighted arithmetic averages over the occupations.
Details of the skill-split calculations can be found in Van Leeuwen and Boeters (2009).
348 Welfare computations
A welfare assessment of policy counterfactuals is performed by computing equivalent variation
(EV) in income, i.e. the exogenous change in income that would have produced the same utility
change as the reform under consideration. Aggregate EV results from the summation over
household-speciﬁc EV. When we interpret EV as a welfare measure, the usual caveat applies: A
positive EV of a policy reform means that if lump-sum redistribution between households is
possible, then a Pareto improvement compared to the initial situation can be generated. Such a
redistribution is not necessarily feasible, and, if feasible, cannot be assumed to actually take
place. Without redistribution, EV is only valid as a welfare measure if utility of different
households is commensurable and marginal utility of income is the same for all households.
This must be kept in mind when interpreting the welfare results.
In the calculation of EV, we must account for the fact that the number of individuals per
representative household is not constant, because there are status changes. This applies both to
individuals that change between unemployment and employment, and between participation and
non-participation. We ﬁrst calculate EV for all possible status combinations (transitions as well
as non-transitions), and then sum up with appropriate weights. The split between high and low
skilled workers remains exogenous and produces no additional problems. It is therefore
suppressed in the equations below.
• Households that are employed and remain employed:
EVEE = ¯ pU (Ue   ¯ Ue)
• Households that switch from employment to unemployment:
EVEU = ¯ pU (Uu   ¯ Ue)
• Households that are unemployed and remain so. These households are subject to a demand
constraint (F = T  d ¯ L; see section 5). Therefore we can restrict the welfare calculation to the
consumption part of the utility function:
EVUU = ¯ pC
 
Cu
D   ¯ Cu
D

• Households that switch from unemployment to employment. Here, again, we have no dual
formulation of the utility function and must calculate equivalent income directly by solving the




















Then EV can be calculated as
EVUE = ¯ pC
  ˜ Cu
D   ¯ Cu
D

35Observe that the treatment of switches into and out of employment is asymmetrical, by the very
nature of EV calculations. In the case of unemployed persons, we ask “What amount of money
would compensate them, given their labour supply constraint, for being unemployed?” and in
the case of employed persons: “Which income loss, given the possibility of optimal adjustment
of labour supply, would make them indifferent to being unemployed?”
• Households with a CD utility structure and without labour supply. These are the residual
household who receives capital and transfer income, and, if revenue neutrality of the policy
reform is not imposed, the public household.
EVCD = ¯ pC
 
C   ¯ C

• Households that switch from non-participation to participation. These households face
idiosyncratic ﬁxed cost of taking up work (see Section 5), which must be accounted for in the
welfare calculation. We discuss the two cases of increasing and decreasing participation apart.20
If the expected utility from participation goes up, participation increases, and we have
N > ¯ N: The worker that was the marginal participant in the initial situation reaps the full gain,
i.e.
EV+




The new marginal participant has a welfare gain of zero, because she is just indifferent compared
to her previous non-participation. Integrating EV between these two points under the assumption












In the opposite case we have expected utility from participation, and therefore participation
itself, going down (N < ¯ N). Then the originally marginal participant has no utility loss, because
she was indifferent to switching to non-participation. The worker who is indifferent in the new
situation, by contrast, suffers the full utility loss.
EV 
















which can be consolidated with (8.1) to become





20 It is possible to integrate the two cases in common expressions, but this does not help to illuminate the situation.
36Finally, we add up all these effects




The labour market module of WorldScan described in this paper integrates different pieces of
labour market theory, which are only found treated separately in the theoretical literature. It
comes as no surprise that such an integration approach produces difﬁculties and loose ends,
which we weren’t able to solve in a completely consistent way. These are discussed in the
following sections.
9.1 Basic consumption in the LES
The ﬁrst problem arises with the calibration of the LES demand system when we have
skill-speciﬁc wages and unemployment. The cross-country estimates from aggregate
consumption data used in GTAP (and adopted in WorldScan) imply an almost 40 percent share
of basic, non-disposable consumption in the EU-15 countries. (This corresponds to a “Frisch
parameter” of about -1.6.) For countries with a lower GDP, this share is even larger. We assume
that this basic consumption is the same for all workers, whether high or low skilled, employed or
unemployed. This means that with a high-to-low skilled wage ratio of more than 1.5 and a
replacement rate of less than 50 percent (which is the case for some of the WorldScan regions),
we are easily locked in a situation where the income of the unemployed low skilled is not
sufﬁcient to cover basic consumption.
There are several possible ways to deal with this problem. As an ad-hoc solution, we set the
Frisch parameters for all countries to the level of the EU-15 and impose a lower bound to the
replacement rate of 50 percent. In doing this, we assume that either there exists a
complementary social assistance system or home production allows individuals to cover their
basic consumption, even if ofﬁcial unemployment beneﬁt payments are not sufﬁcient.
“Basic consumption” is a somewhat elusive concept anyway. The main aim of estimating a
LES is not to make statements about what is absolutely necessary to survive. Rather, “basic
consumption” is a technical means to produce income elasticities of consumption demand that
are in line with empirical ﬁndings. Other utility functions have been proposed for estimation that
produce ﬂexible income elasticities without relying on something like “basic consumption”
(Hanoch, 1975; Hertel et al., 1991; Bröcker, 2005).
An alternative route of dealing with the problem of basic consumption would be to explicitly
model household production along the lines of Benhabib et al. (1991). This would remove the
requirement that basic consumption has to be covered by income generated from sources outside
the household itself.
399.2 Functional versus personal income distribution
In the current labour-market set-up, and in contrast to the earlier representative agent
formulation, WorldScan captures certain aspects of personal income distribution: the distinction
between high and low skilled as well as employed and unemployed individuals. On the other
hand, capital and transfer income is treated separately, which highlights functional income
distribution. Functional income distribution is also stressed by the assumption that only the
residual household saves, whereas the worker households spend there incomes exclusively on
consumption. There are several reasons for this pragmatic, eclectic approach. Most importantly,
for matching skill-speciﬁc labour income with other income sources, it would be necessary to
work with country-speciﬁc micro-data sets, which is beyond the scope of the “MODELS”
project. But even if one is prepared to embark on this enormous amount of data work, several
complications must be overcome.
To start with, this would require a more differentiated household structure than in
WorldScan. In WorldScan, households are essentially groups of identical individuals. This
assumes away all complications that arise both in accounting and in behavioural responses if we
allow for households that consist of several, heterogeneous individuals. Even the basic
combinations of high and low skilled partners, participating and non-participating individuals
would leave us with considerably more household types than are now in WorldScan. Examples
of models that work still at the level of aggregated households, but account for most of the
possible household compositions, are MIMIC (Graaﬂand et al., 2001) and the representative
household version of PACE-L (Böhringer et al., 2005). One step further are models that work
with data from individual households from a micro data set (e.g. Arntz et al., 2008). We know,
however, of no such approach that covers more than a single country.
Even with micro data at hand, savings by worker households may cause considerable
modelling problems. If worker households save, capital income of these households depends on
savings in the past. As we have a model where the status of the household (participation,
employment) can change, past savings are dependent on the complete employment history of the
household. A small number of periods is sufﬁcient to produce an intractably high number of
households to be distinguished. The problems generating from this savings dynamics can only
be managed by either taking resort to trivialising assumptions (all households pool their savings,
so that individual capital income does only depend on aggregate savings, see Hansen, 1985) or
by a dynamic microsimulation set-up.
Given the huge time and data requirements of a microsimulation-based approach, the current
set-up of WorldScan is the best we can do given the resource constraints we are facing. In terms
of economic outcomes, the most important implication is that there is no income effect on labour
supply of capital or transfer income (because worker households do not receive such income in
the model). We do not consider this to be a serious shortcoming, but it must be kept in mind
when interpreting the results.
409.3 Empirical foundation of the wage bargaining equation
The current set-up of wage formation through collective bargaining is micro-founded in the
sense that it can be traced back to the optimising behaviour of agents with speciﬁed objective
functions (see Section 6). However, it leaves no scope for calibrating the resulting wage equation
(6.2) to empirical estimations of wage curve elasticities. This is because the only remaining free
parameter, the relative bargaining power of trade unions, l; is needed to calibrate the model so
that empirical unemployment rates are met.
This is an empirical weakness of the model. Empirical wage curve elasticities have
frequently be estimated, which is an empirical resource that should be used for calibrating the
model. However, the estimated coefﬁcients are very volatile (see Folmer, 2009). This is in itself
a hindrance to calibration. More severely, for most of the estimated coefﬁcients it is not clear
which subset of the model equations exactly corresponds to the estimated wage curves, so that
the empirical estimations cannot be interpreted directly in the context of the model at hand. Take
the elasticity of the wage with respect to the average wage income tax rate as an example. In
order to link the present set-up in WorldScan to an empirical estimate of this elasticity, we must
answer a number of questions: Does the estimation capture to the reaction in a single small
representative sector or in the economy as a whole? If we look at the reaction in an individual
sector, which variables are treated exogenous, which are endogenous? In particular: Which of
the possible feedback effects are included in the reaction whose “elasticity” we are assessing? If
we assume that a higher average tax has a wage-inﬂating effect, this will feed back on the
fallback option of the trade union, leading to further upward wage pressure. Is this included in
the estimated elasticity? Higher wages will lead ﬁrms to demand higher prices. This produces an
adjustment of proﬁts, which, given (6.2) we should expect to affect the bargaining outcome.
Finally, higher prices feed back into a higher price level and therefore lower real wages; again,
this is likely to produce further adjustment. We must cut off these feedback loops somewhere in
order to deﬁne the elasticity we are interested in. Establishing this cut-off point is crucial and
difﬁcult at the same time, because it must both be possible to implement it in the model and to
identify it in the data used for the estimation. If the empirical model used to estimate the wage
curve elasticity deviates from the model to be calibrated, it is almost impossible to construct a
consistent cut-off point ex post. Given the many versions of wage curves that are around in the
empirical literature, and given the fact that in for many estimations, the empirical speciﬁcation is
only loosely motivated by theoretical considerations, the resulting difﬁculties are severe.
For most existing studies, the interpretation of wage curve elasticities is only implicit in the
choice of data (Which regressors? Which level of aggregation? Which lag structure in the
estimation?), which, together with assumptions about the scope and speed of adjustment, give a
vague indication of a correspondence with equations in the general equilibrium model. The only
exception are estimations that remain close to a theoretical model and try to identify the
41parameters of this speciﬁc model, such as Graaﬂand and Huizinga (1999). Still, even such
estimations can only be used if the estimated model is precisely the same as the labour market
module of the general equilibrium model to be calibrated. Graaﬂand and Huizinga (1999)
heavily rely on an informal sector with unobservable productivity, which gives the model the
necessary ﬂexibility to be adjusted to the data. Such a set-up is relatively ill suited for a
multi-sectoral general equilibrium model, except if we are prepared to explicitly model this
informal sector: What kind of goods are produced? And how do they substitute with the goods
produced in the formal economy?21
In principle, if we want a better empirical foundation of the wage equation, we must specify
an empirical version of it, which corresponds as closely as possible the formulation in the
general equilibrium model,22 and confront it with the data. Currently, this is not the case for the
speciﬁcation found in WorldScan. The wage reactions in the model must therefore be treated
with the necessary caution.
9.4 Dynamic calibration of the labour market
Sections 4 to 6 have focused on the static set-up and calibration of the model. If we extend the
model in a recursive dynamic way, as it is the case with WorldScan, we face additional
calibration challenges. The most important one is related to one of the main difﬁculties in
dynamic labour supply theory: In cross-sections, we normally observe labour supply elasticities
that are small, but signiﬁcantly positive, both at the intensive and extensive margins. Taken at
face value, this should lead to higher labour supply over time, where we have productivity
increases and correspondingly higher real wages. But this is not what we actually observe. At
least in the intensive dimension, labour supply rather decreases with increasing productivity.
How can it be explained that in a cross-section the substitution effect dominated the income
effect, and over time it is the inverse?
The most promising line of reasoning seems again to be a model of household production,
which allows us to model increasing opportunity costs of working over time. In a model of
household production, this is easily accommodated through an increase in household
productivity, which matches the productivity change in market labour. As we do not have such a
model of household production in WorldScan, we take resort to a shortcut that captures the basic
idea of this approach.
We introduce compensatory efﬁciency increases for leisure and compensatory changes in the
distribution of ﬁxed costs of taking up work, to counteract the effects of increasing productivity
21 Graaﬂand and Huizinga (1999) work in the context of a model with a single universal good, where such questions do
not arise.
22 To match the current set-up of WorldScan, this would be without an informal sector, but perhaps with the value of
involuntarily unemployed time as a free parameter to be estimated.


















ai is adjusted over time in the baseline calibration of WorldScan, so that the number of supplied
hours remains constant (this makes ai increasing over time). The calibration of the distribution
of ﬁxed costs of taking up work (see Section 5) is repeated for each year, taking the changes in
the endogenous model parameters in (5.2) into account and holding the labour supply elasticity
at the extensive margin, hNw; constant.23 An exogenously given time path of participation rates
is accommodated by adjusting ¯ N and ¯ Ul over time in (5.3). For concreteness, we think of the
resulting shifts in the distribution of ﬁxed costs as shifts in commuting costs (although there are
also other plausible cost components) due to a changing valuation of time, caused by
productivity increases.
Finally, without adjustment, we would have a trend in unemployment over time. Such a
mechanism is already present in the static model, because, with basic consumption, an increase
in the real wages (and, through the replacement rate, in unemployment beneﬁts) has a different
relative utility effect for the employed and the unemployed. The introduction of the
“productivity of leisure” parameter produces a further disproportional utility effect between the
employed and unemployed, which affects the unemployment rate. Such changes are not entirely
without economic rationale, but we consider it as unlikely that they will produce a systematic
trend in unemployment rates. Therefore we opt for treating l; the relative bargaining power of
the trade unions, as a time-varying parameter, and we adjust its level so that unemployment
remains constant over time in the baseline.
23 Otherwise, the secular increase inUe would cause an ever increasing elasticity of labour supply. Thanks to Gerard
Verweij who pointed this out to me.
434410 Illustrative simulations
We illustrate the working mechanisms of the WorldScan labour market module with a series of
scenarios, which are inspired by EU climate policy and the theoretical debate about a possible
“Double Dividend” of environmental taxes. We assume that each EU member country
implements a policy that brings down energy use by 20 percent in the base year of the model,
2001. This is achieved by a uniform tax on energy use, both in production and consumption. In
the base scenario (1), we assume that the revenue of the tax is not recycled, but used for higher
public spending. In the three following scenarios (2-4), we analyse different ways of recycling
the tax revenue.
Although inspired by the current climate policy debate, it should be clear at the outset that
our simulations are purely illustrative and cannot be taken as a quantitative assessment of
existing EU plans. This has several reasons. First, we restrict our attention to the base year,
2001, which allows us to study the model reactions without the complications of dynamic
calibration (Section 9.4) and the discussion about an appropriate baseline choice. Second, we
assume that there is a uniform reduction target for all EU member countries, which disregards
burden-sharing agreements, but simpliﬁes the comparison between countries. Third, the model
version we use does not differentiate energy carriers by their carbon intensity. We simply assume
that emissions are proportional to energy use. All this precludes a quantitative assessment of the
results. Nevertheless, we think that the labour market results are qualitatively robust, and we
expect the ranking of the scenarios in terms of welfare and various labour market indicators to
carry over to a climate policy assessment that takes account of more detail.
10.1 Scenario 1: No tax revenue recycling
In Scenario 1, the energy tax is levied so that the reduction target in each country is met, but no
tax revenue recycling takes place. Tax revenue is used for higher public spending. Table 10.1
reports results for a selected set of ﬁve large European economies: France, Germany, Great
Britain, Italy and Spain. In Appendix D, we add full tables for all WorldScan regions.24
Column “Energy tax” of Table 10.1 gives the necessary tax rate in per cent as an ad-valorem
tax to the energy price exclusive of other taxes. These tax rates are in the range of 50%, which
produces considerable increases in relative energy prices. This has two effects on the real wage.
(In column “Real wage” we report the change in the before-tax wage relative to the consumption
price index.) Wages go down because of the production inefﬁciencies created by the tax (and
corresponding lower productive use of energy and capital), and consumer prices go up because
24 As can be seen in those full tables, the results for the ﬁve large economies singled out in the tables of the main text,
which are relatively uniform, do not always carry over to the smaller countries. Explaining all differences between the
countries requires a lot more analysis in detail.
45Table 10.1 Scenario 1: Labour market results
Energy tax Hours of work Participation Unemployment Real wage
% % % p.p. %
France 61.9
High skilled − 0.354 − 0.734 0.205 − 3.526
Low skilled − 0.216 − 1.098 0.434 − 3.294
Germany 46.1
High skilled − 0.379 − 0.498 0.149 − 3.033
Low skilled − 0.263 − 0.868 0.512 − 3.247
Great Britain 45.0
High skilled − 0.301 − 0.490 0.062 − 2.682
Low skilled − 0.231 − 0.640 0.271 − 2.635
Italy 45.2
High skilled − 0.259 − 0.736 0.136 − 3.022
Low skilled − 0.287 − 0.687 0.379 − 3.031
Spain 42.1
High skilled − 0.305 − 0.699 0.136 − 3.192
Low skilled − 0.291 − 0.897 0.449 − 3.448
of the energy tax on consumption. This results in real wage drops that range between 2.6 and 3.6
percent. The remaining three columns of Table 10.1 display the labour market reactions for the
two skill types at the three relevant margins, which all go in the direction of lower employment.
Hours of work go down by between 0.2 and 0.4 percent. The negative participation reactions are
even stronger, ranging between 0.4 and 1.1 percent. This is a direct reﬂection of the assumed
labour supply elasticities, which are higher at the extensive margin. Finally, unemployment goes
up by between 0.06 and 0.6 percentage points. The change in unemployment can be traced back
to the LES set-up with basic consumption. With lower real incomes, the share of basic
consumption increases and the marginal effect of higher wages on utility becomes higher
relative to the level of utility, which is the crucial relationship in the Nash bargaining set-up. The
change in unemployment is generally larger for the low skilled, because here initial
unemployment rates are higher, and unemployment changes are roughly proportional to the
initial level of unemployment.
Table 10.2 shows the welfare effects in the basic scenario without tax revenue recycling. We
express them as equivalent variation, given as a percentage of GDP (which allows us to directly
compare the results with changes in real GDP below). We use the same decomposition as in
Section 8. For both skill groups, we have individuals that remain employed (“E!E”),
individuals that become unemployed (“E!U”), and individuals that remain unemployed
(“U!U”). The fourth category (“U!E”) is not relevant, because unemployment is increasing
in all countries. The welfare change for the employed dominates the unemployment related
changes, because the employed are by far the largest group. Only for the low skilled, where
unemployment rates are higher, switches to unemployment cause a quantitative relevant welfare
46Table 10.2 Scenario 1: Welfare effects (equivalent variation in % of initial income)
France Germany Gr.Brit. Italy Spain
High skilled
E ! E − 0.368 − 0.435 − 0.516 − 0.265 − 0.315
E ! U − 0.010 − 0.009 − 0.005 − 0.007 − 0.008
U ! U − 0.003 − 0.003 − 0.002 − 0.002 − 0.003
U ! E 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Participation − 0.001 − 0.001 − 0.001 − 0.001 − 0.001
Low skilled
E ! E − 0.402 − 0.425 − 0.477 − 0.424 − 0.590
E ! U − 0.028 − 0.033 − 0.024 − 0.029 − 0.045
U ! U − 0.004 − 0.004 − 0.003 − 0.006 − 0.007
U ! E 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Participation − 0.002 − 0.002 − 0.002 − 0.002 − 0.003
Other income − 0.807 − 0.772 − 0.307 − 0.789 − 0.553
Government 0.148 0.371 0.305 0.235 0.407
Sum − 1.479 − 1.313 − 1.032 − 1.288 − 1.118
GDP − 2.680 − 2.416 − 1.877 − 2.538 − 2.551
contribution. The correction for the ﬁxed costs of those switching to non-participation (positive,
because these are saved ﬁxed costs) is negligible.
What does matter, by contrast, are the changes in government consumption and in other
incomes, given in the rows “Government” and “Other income”, respectively. Adding up (row
“Sum”) produces a welfare loss of between one and one and a half percent of GDP. This is
considerably less than the GDP loss itself (row “GDP”), because lower labour supply directly
translates into lower GDP, whereas it is partly compensated through the positive value of leisure
in the welfare calculations.
10.2 Scenario 2: Lump-sum transfer to worker households
In the three following scenarios (Scenarios 2, 3 and 4), we perform a revenue neutral tax reform
by using one tax instrument for tax revenue recycling, so that the level of real government
consumption remains constant. In Scenario 2, this is a lump-sum transfer to all participating
worker households (the same whether high or low skilled, employed or unemployed).
Comparing Table 10.3 with 10.1 shows the consequences of the lump-sum transfer. The
labour supply reaction at the intensive margin is again negative, and even more so than in
Scenario 1. This is a straightforward income effect of the lump-sum transfer. On the other hand,
the negative participation reaction is less pronounced than in Scenario 1. This is due to the
design of the lump-sum transfer, which is paid to all participating households, thus increasing
the incentives to participate. Finally, unemployment is still going up, but slightly less so than in
Scenario 1. This can again be explained by the basic consumption mechanism. Because of the
lump-sum transfer, real income is not as much reduced as in Scenario 1, and the effect of a
higher share of basic consumption is ameliorated.
47Table 10.3 Scenario 2: Labour market results
Energy tax Hours of work Participation Unemployment Real wage
% % % p.p. %
France 62.9
High skilled − 0.441 − 0.579 0.149 − 3.573
Low skilled − 0.346 − 0.815 0.271 − 3.553
Germany 47.4
High skilled − 0.557 − 0.331 0.098 − 3.350
Low skilled − 0.503 − 0.474 0.225 − 3.706
Great Britain 45.9
High skilled − 0.392 − 0.348 0.042 − 2.740
Low skilled − 0.362 − 0.403 0.155 − 2.810
Italy 46.1
High skilled − 0.422 − 0.541 0.094 − 3.431
Low skilled − 0.472 − 0.495 0.273 − 3.512
Spain 43.5
High skilled − 0.488 − 0.420 0.053 − 3.466
Low skilled − 0.544 − 0.471 0.175 − 3.916
Table 10.4 Scenario 2: Welfare effects (equivalent variation in % of initial income)
France Germany Gr.Brit. Italy Spain
High skilled
E ! E − 0.292 − 0.292 − 0.368 − 0.197 − 0.194
E ! U − 0.007 − 0.006 − 0.004 − 0.004 − 0.003
U ! U − 0.002 − 0.001 − 0.001 − 0.001 0.000
U ! E 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Participation − 0.001 0.000 − 0.001 − 0.001 0.000
Low skilled
E ! E − 0.305 − 0.241 − 0.306 − 0.311 − 0.326
E ! U − 0.018 − 0.014 − 0.013 − 0.021 − 0.018
U ! U − 0.002 0.000 − 0.001 − 0.002 0.001
U ! E 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Participation − 0.001 − 0.001 − 0.001 − 0.001 − 0.001
Other income − 0.772 − 0.685 − 0.275 − 0.715 − 0.474
Government 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sum − 1.401 − 1.240 − 0.969 − 1.251 − 1.015
GDP − 2.519 − 2.197 − 1.737 − 2.420 − 2.257
Table 10.4 shows the welfare effects of Scenario 2, in close analogy to Table 10.2 for Scenario 1.
As the policy reform is now designed to be revenue-neutral, the equivalent variation entry for the
government vanishes. As a complement, welfare losses for the worker households are lower,
because of the lump-sum transfer. Adding up the welfare changes, we end up with a slightly
lower welfare loss than in Scenario 1, caused by the role of the lump-sum transfer in lowering
the distortion at the extensive margin (because it is only paid to workers that are active in the
labour market).
4810.3 Scenario 3: Lower average wage tax rates
In Scenario 3, we recycle the tax revenue from the energy tax by a cut in the average labour
income tax (keeping the marginal tax constant). A lower average tax with a constant marginal
tax amounts to introducing a tax allowance, which is similar in its working mechanisms to a
lump-sum transfer. It seems that, contrary to the case of a lump-sum transfer, only those who
actually have a job can beneﬁt, but this is not actually the case, because unemployment beneﬁts
are linked to after-tax income through the replacement rate. The only signiﬁcant difference of
this scenario with Scenario 2 is that the progressivity of the labour tax is changed.
Table 10.5 Scenario 3: Labour market results
Energy tax Hours of work Participation Unemployment Real wage
% % % p.p. %
France 63.4
High skilled − 0.607 − 0.313 0.005 − 3.724
Low skilled − 0.423 − 0.648 0.134 − 3.701
Germany 48.1
High skilled − 0.831 0.028 − 0.118 − 3.564
Low skilled − 0.649 − 0.235 − 0.053 − 3.976
Great Britain 46.1
High skilled − 0.490 − 0.191 0.000 − 2.789
Low skilled − 0.408 − 0.325 0.071 − 2.880
Italy 47.1
High skilled − 0.736 − 0.021 − 0.142 − 3.881
Low skilled − 0.751 − 0.139 − 0.158 − 4.075
Spain 44.4
High skilled − 0.811 0.119 − 0.262 − 3.826
Low skilled − 0.755 − 0.123 − 0.229 − 4.299
Table 10.5 shows the labour market effects of this policy variant. Most straightforward is the
effect on unemployment. A lower average tax rate with the same marginal tax rate increases the
tax progressivity of the labour tax. This makes higher wages less attractive for the trade union in
the wage bargain (see Koskela and Vilmunen, 1996, for the general argument). We end up with
lower wages and lower unemployment. Better employment opportunities, in turn, make
participation more attractive, which gives a higher participation rate than in Scenario 2 (in Spain,
participation of the high skilled even goes up relative to the initial situation). Through lower
unemployment and higher participation, the transfer equivalent of the tax allowance can be
higher than in Scenario 2, so that the negative income effect on hours of work is increased, and
the negative reaction at the intensive margin is stronger than in Scenario 2.
The welfare effects in Scenario 3 (Table 10.6) are similar to those of the previous scenarios.
Again, the entry “Government” vanishes, because the policy reform is revenue-neutral. As
unemployment is decreasing for a subset of countries and skill types, we now also have the row
49Table 10.6 Scenario 3: Welfare effects (equivalent variation in % of initial income)
France Germany Gr.Brit. Italy Spain
High skilled
E ! E − 0.162 0.019 − 0.204 − 0.014 0.041
E ! U 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
U ! U − 0.002 0.000 − 0.001 0.000 0.000
U ! E 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.012
Participation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Low skilled
E ! E − 0.247 − 0.129 − 0.249 − 0.102 − 0.109
E ! U − 0.009 0.000 − 0.006 0.000 0.000
U ! U − 0.002 − 0.001 − 0.002 − 0.002 − 0.002
U ! E 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.009 0.017
Participation − 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Other income − 0.910 − 1.024 − 0.465 − 1.011 − 0.820
Government 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sum − 1.332 − 1.128 − 0.926 − 1.117 − 0.861
GDP − 2.386 − 1.986 − 1.667 − 2.152 − 1.931
“U!E”. However, both unemployment changes and changes at the extensive margin are low, so
that all entries except for those remaining employed and “Other income” are negligible.
Because of the positive effects on unemployment, the welfare changes are slightly less
negative than in Scenario 2. This is in line with the GDP changes, which we again ﬁnd to be
roughly twice as large as the welfare changes.
10.4 Scenario 4: Lower average and marginal wage tax rates
In our last scenario, we not only lower the average labour tax rate, but also the marginal rate.
The percentage change in both tax rates is the same, so that the progressivity of the tax system
remains almost constant.
The quantitative effects in this scenario can be seen in Table 10.7. Through the tax
progressivity mechanism, unemployment is higher than in Scenario 3, and back to levels that we
already had in Scenarios 1 and 2. Because of the lower marginal labour tax rate, higher working
hours become attractive. Labour supply at the intensive margin is uniformly higher than in all
other scenarios, and in a number of cases even higher than in the initial situation. The effects at
the extensive margin are mixed. On the one hand, higher unemployment (than in Scenario 3)
discourages participation. On the other hand, through the lower labour-leisure tax distortion, the
situation of those with a job is more attractive. Countries and skill groups differ in how large
these effects are and which of them dominates.
The welfare effects of Scenario 4 are displayed in Table 10.8. Compared to Scenario 3, the
negative consequences of higher unemployment are more signiﬁcant, particularly for the low
skilled. In addition, there appears to be a redistributive effect from other income to labour
50Table 10.7 Scenario 4: Labour market results
Energy tax Hours of work Participation Unemployment Real wage
% % % p.p. %
France 63.9
High skilled − 0.146 − 0.333 0.135 − 3.927
Low skilled 0.049 − 0.625 0.419 − 3.784
Germany 48.9
High skilled − 0.148 − 0.008 0.030 − 3.949
Low skilled 0.097 − 0.203 0.335 − 4.159
Great Britain 46.6
High skilled − 0.149 − 0.192 0.035 − 2.954
Low skilled − 0.054 − 0.303 0.195 − 2.978
Italy 47.8
High skilled 0.136 − 0.035 0.124 − 4.448
Low skilled 0.018 − 0.131 0.280 − 4.363
Spain 44.8
High skilled 0.078 0.027 0.073 − 4.170
Low skilled 0.104 − 0.165 0.329 − 4.388
Table 10.8 Scenario 4: Welfare effects (equivalent variation in % of initial income)
France Germany Gr.Brit. Italy Spain
High skilled
E ! E − 0.167 − 0.006 − 0.203 − 0.008 0.016
E ! U − 0.007 − 0.002 − 0.003 − 0.006 − 0.004
U ! U − 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001
U ! E 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Participation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Low skilled
E ! E − 0.220 − 0.089 − 0.222 − 0.068 − 0.088
E ! U − 0.027 − 0.021 − 0.017 − 0.021 − 0.033
U ! U − 0.002 0.000 − 0.001 0.000 0.000
U ! E 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Participation − 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Other income − 0.906 − 1.030 − 0.467 − 1.028 − 0.819
Government 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sum − 1.330 − 1.148 − 0.914 − 1.131 − 0.928
GDP − 2.257 − 1.725 − 1.484 − 1.947 − 1.775
income. The welfare effects are in the same range as with Scenario 3, but not qualitatively the
same in all countries. In terms of equivalent variation, Scenario 4 is preferable in France and
Great Britain, but inferior in Germany, Italy, and Spain. Abstracting from the original
environmental interest, comparing Scenarios 3 and 4 informs us about the desirability of higher
tax progressivity (in Scenario 3). We see that the case is not uniform across countries, which
reﬂects the fact that the trade-off between lower unemployment and less distortions of the
hours-of-work decision is resolved at different points (see Sørensen (1999) for the general
argument and a simple numerical model).
51In addition, comparing Tables 10.8 and 10.6 shows cases in which welfare and GDP do not
move in line. GDP is higher in Scenario 4 in all ﬁve countries, but, as we have discussed, for
three countries welfare is lower. This is possible because GDP reacts uniformly to labour supply
increases at either of the margins, while the distortionary effects (which determine welfare
changes) at theses three margins are different.
10.5 Summary of the scenarios
Table 10.9 summarises the scenarios. We repeat the welfare effects from the tables before, and
show in addition the total employment effect, aggregated over the three margins (participation,
hours of work and involuntary unemployment). In all of the ﬁve countries and for both skill
types there is a clear ranking in employment: lowest in Scenario 1, then 2, 3, and highest in
Scenario 4. We have seen in the detailed analysis in the sections before, however, that this clear
ranking hides considerable different movements along the three margins.
Table 10.9 Summary of the scenarios
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
France
Welfare (EV) − 1.479 − 1.401 − 1.332 − 1.330
Employment high skilled − 1.299 − 1.173 − 0.923 − 0.620
Employment low skilled − 1.788 − 1.457 − 1.216 − 1.040
Germany
Welfare (EV) − 1.313 − 1.240 − 1.127 − 1.148
Employment high skilled − 1.030 − 0.987 − 0.681 − 0.186
Employment low skilled − 1.693 − 1.222 − 0.824 − 0.480
Great Britain
Welfare (EV) − 1.032 − 0.969 − 0.926 − 0.914
Employment high skilled − 0.852 − 0.782 − 0.681 − 0.377
Employment low skilled − 1.159 − 0.930 − 0.808 − 0.566
Italy
Welfare (EV) − 1.288 − 1.251 − 1.116 − 1.131
Employment high skilled − 1.136 − 1.059 − 0.608 − 0.031
Employment low skilled − 1.396 − 1.270 − 0.712 − 0.429
Spain
Welfare (EV) − 1.118 − 1.015 − 0.861 − 0.927
Employment high skilled − 1.146 − 0.962 − 0.413 0.027
Employment low skilled − 1.690 − 1.210 − 0.619 − 0.435
Welfare is linked to employment, but not perfectly so. For Scenarios 1 through 3, the changes
are precisely parallel: Higher employment goes along with higher welfare. Between Scenarios 3
and 4 the link is broken (as discussed in Section 10.4). Here we have cases in which welfare
goes down in spite of higher employment.
52As a general result, welfare changes are much less volatile than employment changes.
Employment reductions cover the whole range of no change (or even a slight employment gain
for the high skilled in Scenario 4 in Spain) to a loss of 1.8 per cent. The welfare results, by
contrast, only vary in a relatively narrow range of about 10 per cent between the Scenarios (and
within the same country).
535411 Summary and Conclusions
We present a labour market module for WorldScan in which labour supply and unemployment
are endogenous variables, not exogenous parameters, which they were in the previous set-up.
Labour supply at the intensive margin (hours of work) results from the optimising
consumption-leisure choice of a representative household. Labour supply at the extensive
margin (participation) is modelled as the comparison of the expected utility of participation with
a ﬁxed cost of taking up work, which varies between households. Wages and unemployment are
determined through collective bargaining between ﬁrms and a trade union in a representative
sector of each economy.
These modelling choices produce interaction effects, which are integrated in the model as far
as possible. Labour supply at the two margins has different consequences for unemployment:
Without labour demand reactions, an additional participating worker increases unemployment,
whereas an additional hour of an already participating worker does not. Unemployment, in turn,
affects labour supply at the extensive margin, because the households consider the expected
value of participation in their decision and high unemployment rates have a discouraging effect.
Finally, bargained wages feed back to the individual hours-of-work decision, which then
co-determines employment in persons.
Interaction effects turn out to be intricate and are not always resolved in a completely
consistent way in WorldScan. Most prominently, the empirical parameters of the Linear
Expenditure System are not in all cases compatible with empirical wage differentials and
replacement rates. Second, there remains a ambiguity between personal and functional income
distribution in the disaggregated household accounting. And ﬁnally, the wage bargaining
equation is not calibrated to empirical wage curve elasticities. However, we think that these
weak points of the current set-up are not dominant as drivers of the model’s basic reactions to
policy shocks. Nevertheless, they must be kept in mind when interpreting the simulation results.
The working mechanisms of the model have been illustrated in some scenarios that analyse
the labour market consequences of a policy that restricts energy use by a uniform tax on
consumption and intermediate production inputs. We compare a scenario in which tax revenue is
used for higher public spending with three variants of budget-balancing tax revenue recycling.
The simulation results conﬁrm that the tax recycling instruments (lump-sum transfer, average
and marginal labour income tax rate) have different effects on the three margins of employment.
Hours of work are most sensitive to the marginal labour tax rate, participation is more closely
linked to the average tax rate, and unemployment is most directly affected by the progressivity of
the tax schedule. It turns out that a policy that recycles the revenue from the energy tax through
lower average labour taxes is most effective in restricting the welfare losses induced by the
reduction in energy use. The role of tax progressivity remains ambiguous. There are countries in
which a reform that increases tax progressivity is preferable, as well as countries in which the
55outcome is the opposite. As a coarse rule, welfare moves in line with both employment and
GDP. However, this close interrelatedness is broken once we come to the Scenarios with varying
tax progressivity.
We see simulations like the ones in Section 10 as the typical use of the model. We then ask:
What are the labour market consequences of non-labour market policies like climate policy
(energy taxation), R&D stimulation policy (producing productivity spillovers) or trade
liberalisation (trade in services)? In addition to the labour market results that the model
generates (labour supply, wages, unemployment), it also allows us a more precise assessment of
the economic effects on productivity (which are inﬂuenced by employment) and the public
budget (in particular if we impose a revenue-neutrality requirement) than a model with
exogenous labour supply.
In contrast to the analysis of such non-labour market policies, the usefulness of the model is
restricted in the case of labour market policy itself. Here, the model clearly lacks a lot of
necessary detail in a number of dimensions: It has no age structure25 (which we need if we want
to analyse human capital formation or retirement), it has no wage heterogeneity within skill
groups (which we need if we want to analyse subsidy schemes targeted to the low-income
segment of the labour market), and its disaggregation of households is limited to skill type and
employment status. (We need the composition of households if we want to analyse the
participation of married women.) Anyway, we do not think that such speciﬁc labour market
questions should be analysed using multi-country CGE models. Instead, this is the domain of
comparative microsimulation (Immervoll et al., 2004) or models tailored to the particular
conditions of a speciﬁc national tax and transfer system and demography, like MIMIC
(Graaﬂand et al., 2001) or PACE-L (Arntz et al., 2008) .
25 As described in Section 2, the age structure is taken account of in the calibration of the model. However, the
endogenous equation block only contains aggregate employment, so that no age speciﬁc reactions to policy changes can
be calculated.
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5960Appendix A Variable names in WorldScan
Table A.1 Variable names in WorldScan
Variable Description WorldScan
C0 basic consumption (not disposable) CSSCWN_
CD disposable consumption YD_CVN_
Ci disposable consumption of good i CNS_WN_
E employment LEINVN_
F leisure (as a multiple of initial leisure) LEICVI_
h density of ﬁxed cost distribution (participation) CN_DPM_
L labour supply (hours as a multiple of initial hours) LSINMI_
N labour supply (participation) LSEXMN_
pc
i price of consumption good i CNS_PN_
pU expenditure function (“price of utility”) YD_CPI_
r replacement rate URR_PM_
T time endowment (as a multiple of initial hours) LEIFQN_
ta average wage tax rate TF_QPM_
tm marginal wage tax rate TFM_QN_
u unemployment rate LUNPQN_
Ue utility of employed worker YD_CVN_
Ul expected utility from participation YDECUN_
Uu utility of unemployed worker YD_CUI_
w before-tax wage LEMFPN_
Y0 non-labour income TRF_WN_
YD disposable extended income YD_CWN_
YE extended income of worker household YE_CWN_
gi basic consumption of good i CN_SPM_
hLw wage elasticity of labour supply (hours) CN_WPM_
hLY income elasticity of labour supply (hours) CN_YPM_
hPw wage elasticity of labour supply (participation) CN_EPM_
l relative bargaining power of trade unions BRG_PM_
p proﬁts PRF_WN_
s EoS (consumption, leisure) CN_LPM_
qC value share of consumption inYD CNDCQN0
qi value share good i consumption in CD CN_APM_
6162Appendix B Details of the labour market calibration
Table B.1 WorldScan regions
Region Region
AUT* Austria ESP* Spain
BLU* Belgium and Luxemburg SWE* Sweden
DNK* Denmark CZE* Czech Republic
FIN* Finland HUN* Hungary
FRA* France POL* Poland
DEU* Germany SVK Slovakia
GBR* United Kingdom SVN* Slovenia
GRC* Greece REX Remaining EU25
IRL* Ireland ROE Remaining OECD
ITA* Italy USA* United States
NLD* Netherlands AAT Rest of World
PRT* Portugal
* calibrated with OECD institutional data
Table B.2 Column items for Tables B.3 and B.4
TF_QPM average wage tax
TFMQPM marginal wage tax
CSSCQN basic consumption as a share of total consumption
LEIFPM disposable time endowment as a multiple of working hours
CNSCQN value share of consumption in extended income
CN_LPM elasticity of substitution (leisure, material consumption)
63Table B.3 Calibration details (low skilled)
TF_QPM TFMQPM CSSCQN LEIFPM CNSCQN CN_LPM
AUT 0.444 0.550 0.382 1.067 0.919 2.928
BLU 0.401 0.595 0.400 1.064 0.932 2.793
DNK 0.427 0.516 0.425 1.063 0.916 3.209
FIN 0.414 0.532 0.376 1.068 0.920 2.879
FRA 0.375 0.621 0.426 1.061 0.939 2.797
DEU 0.355 0.512 0.445 1.060 0.924 3.166
GBR 0.218 0.371 0.434 1.062 0.920 3.186
GRC 0.391 0.391 0.406 1.066 0.900 3.365
IRL 0.144 0.275 0.415 1.064 0.915 3.156
ITA 0.394 0.460 0.370 1.069 0.911 3.003
NLD 0.350 0.522 0.522 1.052 0.926 3.629
PRT 0.240 0.330 0.455 1.060 0.912 3.451
ESP 0.324 0.480 0.396 1.065 0.923 2.926
SWE 0.492 0.549 0.391 1.067 0.911 3.102
CZE 0.457 0.490 0.384 1.068 0.906 3.144
HUN 0.325 0.447 0.257 1.081 0.918 2.448
POL 0.327 0.372 0.373 1.069 0.907 3.085
SVK 0.397 0.438 0.362 1.070 0.907 3.030
SVN 0.326 0.326 0.295 1.078 0.900 2.836
REX 0.314 0.314 0.332 1.074 0.900 2.996
ROE 0.262 0.262 0.469 1.059 0.900 3.764
USA 0.232 0.306 0.408 1.065 0.910 3.214
AAT 0.123 0.123 0.485 1.057 0.900 3.885
64Table B.4 Calibration details (high skilled)
TF_QPM TFMQPM CSSCQN LEIFPM CNSCQN CN_LPM
AUT 0.556 0.657 0.240 1.082 0.923 2.332
BLU 0.501 0.618 0.327 1.073 0.923 2.624
DNK 0.537 0.649 0.316 1.074 0.924 2.571
FIN 0.523 0.624 0.257 1.081 0.921 2.406
FRA 0.495 0.525 0.295 1.078 0.906 2.754
DEU 0.435 0.347 0.292 1.080 0.885 3.045
GBR 0.295 0.266 0.308 1.077 0.896 2.950
GRC 0.460 0.584 0.266 1.080 0.923 2.412
IRL 0.297 0.458 0.313 1.074 0.923 2.578
ITA 0.459 0.559 0.346 1.071 0.918 2.773
NLD 0.382 0.504 0.291 1.077 0.920 2.540
PRT 0.309 0.415 0.233 1.084 0.915 2.407
ESP 0.404 0.474 0.292 1.078 0.912 2.659
SWE 0.558 0.650 0.274 1.079 0.921 2.469
CZE 0.496 0.526 0.331 1.074 0.906 2.902
HUN 0.397 0.495 0.178 1.090 0.916 2.237
POL 0.346 0.364 0.294 1.078 0.903 2.792
SVK 0.435 0.488 0.325 1.074 0.909 2.824
SVN 0.326 0.326 0.169 1.092 0.900 2.406
REX 0.313 0.313 0.210 1.088 0.900 2.532
ROE 0.268 0.268 0.260 1.082 0.900 2.704
USA 0.301 0.415 0.257 1.081 0.916 2.474
AAT 0.144 0.144 0.212 1.088 0.900 2.538
Table B.5 Column items for Table B.6
LSUPQN Initial participation rate (as a share of total population older than 15)
LSEXMP- Lower bound ofU0 (as a multiple of the initial utility level)
LSEXMP+ Upper bound ofU0 (as a multiple of the initial utility level)
65Table B.6 Calibration details (participation)
low skilled high skilled
LSUPQN LSEXMP- LSEXMP+ LSUPQN LSEXMP- LSEXMP+
AUT 0.483 − 5.022 7.439 0.483 − 3.688 6.012
BLU 0.427 − 4.255 8.060 0.427 − 4.258 8.063
DNK 0.535 − 5.726 6.849 0.535 − 4.123 5.455
FIN 0.505 − 4.878 6.751 0.505 − 3.882 5.776
FRA 0.448 − 3.961 7.112 0.448 − 5.044 8.447
DEU 0.490 − 5.303 7.549 0.490 − 6.216 8.497
GBR 0.487 − 5.530 7.881 0.487 − 5.739 8.101
GRC 0.432 − 6.571 10.972 0.432 − 3.846 7.383
IRL 0.458 − 5.625 8.844 0.458 − 4.177 7.129
ITA 0.413 − 5.445 10.178 0.413 − 4.720 9.145
NLD 0.510 − 6.123 7.845 0.510 − 4.200 5.997
PRT 0.502 − 6.374 8.310 0.502 − 4.048 6.004
ESP 0.456 − 4.869 8.014 0.456 − 4.681 7.790
SWE 0.506 − 5.649 7.482 0.506 − 4.025 5.899
CZE 0.500 − 5.897 7.886 0.500 − 5.369 7.359
HUN 0.412 − 4.058 8.223 0.412 − 3.671 7.669
POL 0.451 − 5.751 9.215 0.451 − 5.213 8.560
SVK 0.489 − 5.630 7.917 0.489 − 5.107 7.372
SVN 0.481 − 5.381 7.880 0.481 − 4.413 6.836
REX 0.464 − 5.741 8.779 0.464 − 4.697 7.574
ROE 0.471 − 7.468 10.509 0.471 − 5.084 7.832
USA 0.504 − 5.938 7.815 0.504 − 4.163 6.072
AAT 0.467 − 7.740 10.957 0.467 − 4.710 7.505
66Appendix C Labour market effects of variations in
institutional parameters
Table C.1 Column items for Tables C.2 to C.7
Wage per cent change in producer wage
Unemployment percentage point change in unemployment rate
Unemployment(r) per cent change in unemployment rate
Employment per cent change in employment (hours)
Hours per cent change in hours (per employed person)
Participation per cent change in participation (in persons)
Table C.2 Effects (%) of one p.p. increase in the average wage tax (low skilled)
Wage Unemployment Unemployment(r) Employment Hours Participation
AUT 0.290 0.223 4.811 − 0.152 0.482 − 0.398
BLU 0.395 0.339 3.953 − 0.380 0.389 − 0.397
DNK 0.352 0.230 4.663 − 0.184 0.408 − 0.348
FIN 0.490 0.434 3.472 − 0.520 0.325 − 0.349
FRA 0.444 0.373 3.643 − 0.486 0.339 − 0.409
DEU 0.394 0.364 3.523 − 0.444 0.300 − 0.337
GBR 0.241 0.216 3.023 − 0.248 0.259 − 0.273
GRC 0.439 0.553 4.563 − 0.483 0.451 − 0.302
IRL 0.193 0.159 3.119 − 0.130 0.278 − 0.240
ITA 0.416 0.460 3.997 − 0.423 0.424 − 0.325
NLD 0.259 0.146 4.208 − 0.231 0.271 − 0.350
PRT 0.199 0.205 4.520 − 0.102 0.404 − 0.290
ESP 0.401 0.450 3.715 − 0.446 0.403 − 0.336
SWE 0.451 0.352 4.772 − 0.384 0.378 − 0.381
CZE 0.478 0.566 5.126 − 0.512 0.524 − 0.397
HUN 0.294 0.295 3.799 − 0.264 0.436 − 0.378
POL 0.652 0.675 2.776 − 0.852 0.301 − 0.259
SVK 0.841 0.754 2.752 − 1.002 0.292 − 0.255
SVN 0.273 0.260 3.110 − 0.272 0.294 − 0.282
USA 0.221 0.201 3.195 − 0.184 0.287 − 0.256
67Table C.3 Effects (%) of one p.p. increase in the average wage tax (high skilled)
Wage Unemployment Unemployment(r) Employment Hours Participation
AUT 0.189 0.061 5.109 − 0.059 0.530 − 0.524
BLU 0.275 0.135 4.996 − 0.107 0.488 − 0.454
DNK 0.271 0.196 5.762 − 0.116 0.589 − 0.499
FIN 0.299 0.235 5.864 − 0.061 0.658 − 0.471
FRA 0.323 0.266 5.217 − 0.150 0.510 − 0.378
DEU 0.229 0.222 5.411 − 0.045 0.489 − 0.300
GBR 0.146 0.076 3.820 0.027 0.365 − 0.259
GRC 0.388 0.248 3.696 − 0.281 0.391 − 0.405
IRL 0.145 0.051 3.218 − 0.077 0.302 − 0.326
ITA 0.307 0.225 4.092 − 0.257 0.386 − 0.403
NLD 0.102 0.087 5.825 0.188 0.657 − 0.377
PRT 0.164 0.064 2.926 − 0.093 0.282 − 0.308
ESP 0.314 0.227 3.341 − 0.253 0.325 − 0.333
SWE 0.186 0.201 8.754 0.208 0.953 − 0.533
CZE 0.181 0.103 5.141 − 0.067 0.472 − 0.432
HUN 0.114 0.041 3.720 − 0.033 0.404 − 0.394
POL 0.272 0.182 4.036 − 0.083 0.417 − 0.309
SVK 0.298 0.318 7.237 − 0.063 0.761 − 0.487
SVN 0.110 0.080 3.644 0.026 0.409 − 0.300
USA 0.148 0.062 3.087 − 0.050 0.319 − 0.306
Table C.4 Effects (%) of one p.p. increase in the marginal wage tax (low skilled)
Wage Unemployment Unemployment(r) Employment Hours Participation
AUT 0.183 − 0.091 − 1.964 − 0.285 − 0.379 − 0.001
BLU 0.114 − 0.205 − 2.385 − 0.166 − 0.407 0.019
DNK 0.160 − 0.089 − 1.808 − 0.270 − 0.360 − 0.004
FIN 0.040 − 0.272 − 2.179 − 0.044 − 0.395 0.041
FRA 0.080 − 0.262 − 2.564 − 0.108 − 0.426 0.026
DEU 0.078 − 0.206 − 1.998 − 0.106 − 0.361 0.026
GBR 0.096 − 0.110 − 1.539 − 0.145 − 0.280 0.017
GRC 0.045 − 0.207 − 1.707 − 0.071 − 0.337 0.031
IRL 0.102 − 0.071 − 1.398 − 0.153 − 0.247 0.019
ITA 0.054 − 0.225 − 1.954 − 0.067 − 0.357 0.037
NLD 0.198 − 0.066 − 1.908 − 0.266 − 0.345 0.011
PRT 0.108 − 0.062 − 1.371 − 0.196 − 0.268 0.007
ESP 0.033 − 0.236 − 1.951 − 0.044 − 0.348 0.036
SWE 0.145 − 0.153 − 2.080 − 0.229 − 0.406 0.012
CZE 0.079 − 0.222 − 2.012 − 0.102 − 0.385 0.035
HUN 0.111 − 0.138 − 1.785 − 0.144 − 0.320 0.026
POL − 0.275 − 0.538 − 2.212 0.410 − 0.396 0.098
SVK − 0.561 − 0.802 − 2.929 0.734 − 0.507 0.141
SVN 0.092 − 0.128 − 1.533 − 0.124 − 0.295 0.032
USA 0.090 − 0.090 − 1.425 − 0.154 − 0.270 0.020
68Table C.5 Effects (%) of one p.p. increase in the marginal wage tax (high skilled)
Wage Unemployment Unemployment(r) Employment Hours Participation
AUT 0.332 − 0.031 − 2.573 − 0.467 − 0.464 − 0.034
BLU 0.244 − 0.064 − 2.377 − 0.376 − 0.427 − 0.016
DNK 0.249 − 0.081 − 2.378 − 0.424 − 0.450 − 0.057
FIN 0.223 − 0.094 − 2.347 − 0.371 − 0.434 − 0.034
FRA 0.179 − 0.102 − 1.991 − 0.278 − 0.383 − 0.002
DEU 0.158 − 0.066 − 1.617 − 0.225 − 0.307 0.013
GBR 0.133 − 0.027 − 1.366 − 0.223 − 0.261 0.010
GRC 0.170 − 0.155 − 2.306 − 0.230 − 0.405 0.010
IRL 0.177 − 0.030 − 1.846 − 0.263 − 0.309 0.016
ITA 0.214 − 0.116 − 2.102 − 0.253 − 0.381 0.007
NLD 0.195 − 0.027 − 1.833 − 0.321 − 0.328 − 0.021
PRT 0.181 − 0.038 − 1.733 − 0.239 − 0.292 0.014
ESP 0.143 − 0.129 − 1.899 − 0.184 − 0.345 0.023
SWE 0.304 − 0.050 − 2.179 − 0.468 − 0.420 − 0.099
CZE 0.270 − 0.039 − 1.966 − 0.320 − 0.372 0.012
HUN 0.244 − 0.021 − 1.881 − 0.301 − 0.330 0.008
POL 0.168 − 0.069 − 1.539 − 0.199 − 0.286 0.015
SVK 0.232 − 0.079 − 1.806 − 0.246 − 0.334 0.005
SVN 0.159 − 0.034 − 1.540 − 0.222 − 0.277 0.020
USA 0.163 − 0.034 − 1.710 − 0.246 − 0.296 0.015
Table C.6 Effects (%) of one p.p. increase in the replacement rate (low skilled)
Wage Unemployment Unemployment(r) Employment Hours Participation
AUT 0.027 0.035 0.761 − 0.048 0.001 − 0.012
BLU 0.061 0.072 0.838 − 0.102 0.001 − 0.025
DNK 0.031 0.049 0.990 − 0.064 0.002 − 0.014
FIN 0.086 0.106 0.849 − 0.146 0.004 − 0.029
FRA 0.073 0.077 0.757 − 0.122 − 0.002 − 0.034
DEU 0.075 0.093 0.901 − 0.119 0.003 − 0.018
GBR 0.047 0.068 0.952 − 0.081 0.002 − 0.010
GRC 0.115 0.170 1.404 − 0.232 0.011 − 0.049
IRL 0.032 0.047 0.921 − 0.054 0.002 − 0.007
ITA 0.139 0.140 1.212 − 0.186 0.011 − 0.039
NLD 0.023 0.031 0.894 − 0.035 0.001 − 0.003
PRT 0.024 0.039 0.859 − 0.049 0.001 − 0.010
ESP 0.091 0.112 0.925 − 0.171 − 0.007 − 0.037
SWE 0.045 0.069 0.936 − 0.090 0.003 − 0.019
CZE 0.126 0.138 1.248 − 0.175 0.008 − 0.029
HUN 0.046 0.048 0.615 − 0.064 0.001 − 0.014
POL 0.358 0.361 1.483 − 0.532 0.025 − 0.081
SVK 0.517 0.444 1.621 − 0.671 0.031 − 0.091
SVN 0.042 0.056 0.671 − 0.063 0.004 − 0.006
USA 0.039 0.058 0.918 − 0.066 0.003 − 0.007
69Table C.7 Effects (%) of one p.p. increase in the replacement rate (high skilled)
Wage Unemployment Unemployment(r) Employment Hours Participation
AUT 0.009 0.011 0.887 − 0.013 0.000 − 0.003
BLU 0.019 0.026 0.948 − 0.032 0.001 − 0.007
DNK 0.000 0.045 1.332 0.014 0.061 0.000
FIN 0.030 0.038 0.950 − 0.056 0.001 − 0.017
FRA 0.048 0.065 1.276 − 0.084 0.004 − 0.019
DEU 0.046 0.064 1.567 − 0.072 0.006 − 0.011
GBR 0.015 0.026 1.284 − 0.028 0.002 − 0.004
GRC 0.054 0.065 0.967 − 0.083 0.002 − 0.016
IRL 0.010 0.015 0.959 − 0.017 0.001 − 0.002
ITA 0.053 0.055 0.992 − 0.066 0.004 − 0.012
NLD − 0.001 0.021 1.371 0.020 0.040 0.000
PRT 0.017 0.023 1.053 − 0.025 0.001 − 0.002
ESP 0.009 0.135 1.980 − 0.016 0.157 − 0.028
SWE 0.022 0.023 0.995 − 0.037 0.001 − 0.015
CZE 0.019 0.022 1.082 − 0.023 0.001 − 0.003
HUN 0.007 0.008 0.764 − 0.010 0.000 − 0.002
POL 0.043 0.049 1.095 − 0.056 0.004 − 0.008
SVK 0.051 0.046 1.048 − 0.058 0.003 − 0.013
SVN 0.015 0.021 0.947 − 0.023 0.002 − 0.003
USA 0.013 0.019 0.973 − 0.021 0.001 − 0.002
70Appendix D Simulation results for all WorldScan regions
Table D.1 Column items for Tables D.2 to D.5
TAXKQN uniform "Kyoto" tax rate as a percentage of producer prices
LSINMP.LSL per cent change in hours (intensive margin) for low skilled
LSINMP.HSL per cent change in hours (intensive margin) for high skilled
LSEXMP.LSL per cent change in participation (extensive margin) for low skilled
LSEXMP.HSL per cent change in participation (extensive margin) for high skilled
UNPDQN.LSL percentage point change in unemployment for low skilled
UNPDQN.HSL percentage point change in unemployment for high skilled
Table D.2 Detailed country results for Scenario 1
TAXKQN LSINMP LSEXMP UNPDQN
LSL HSL LSL HSL LSL HSL
AUT 0.467 − 0.339 − 0.282 − 0.958 − 0.893 0.254 0.032
BLU 0.369 − 0.238 − 0.271 − 0.998 − 0.870 0.254 0.058
DNK 0.523 − 0.305 − 0.262 − 0.778 − 0.854 0.249 0.097
FIN 0.370 − 0.338 − 0.340 − 1.018 − 1.041 0.612 0.123
FRA 0.619 − 0.216 − 0.354 − 1.098 − 0.734 0.434 0.205
DEU 0.461 − 0.263 − 0.379 − 0.868 − 0.498 0.512 0.149
GBR 0.450 − 0.231 − 0.301 − 0.640 − 0.490 0.271 0.062
GRC 0.350 − 0.369 − 0.277 − 0.529 − 0.753 0.401 0.078
IRL 0.335 − 0.221 − 0.216 − 0.533 − 0.660 0.176 0.044
ITA 0.452 − 0.287 − 0.259 − 0.687 − 0.736 0.379 0.136
NLD 0.267 − 0.238 − 0.239 − 0.859 − 0.725 0.193 0.019
PRT 0.437 − 0.484 − 0.413 − 1.065 − 1.052 0.383 0.055
ESP 0.421 − 0.291 − 0.305 − 0.897 − 0.699 0.449 0.136
SWE 0.538 − 0.381 − 0.286 − 0.899 − 0.859 0.444 0.048
CZE 0.321 − 0.495 − 0.462 − 0.984 − 0.896 0.658 0.071
HUN 0.352 − 0.390 − 0.370 − 1.095 − 0.987 0.291 0.026
POL 0.278 − 0.290 − 0.268 − 0.643 − 0.494 0.977 0.063
SVK 0.247 − 0.469 − 0.449 − 0.993 − 0.925 1.667 0.124
SVN 0.313 − 0.432 − 0.337 − 0.805 − 0.623 0.384 0.030
REX 0.218 − 0.497 − 0.310 − 0.876 − 0.528 0.564 0.005
ROE 0.016 0.014 0.033 0.029 − 0.012 0.001
USA 0.017 0.010 0.042 0.028 − 0.012 0.001
AAT − 0.001 − 0.003 0.002 − 0.004
71Table D.3 Detailed country results for Scenario 2
TAXKQN LSINMP LSEXMP UNPDQN
LSL HSL LSL HSL LSL HSL
AUT 0.486 − 0.727 − 0.511 − 0.213 − 0.400 0.019 0.007
BLU 0.376 − 0.368 − 0.371 − 0.759 − 0.675 0.149 0.032
DNK 0.534 − 0.435 − 0.356 − 0.560 − 0.678 0.160 0.068
FIN 0.383 − 0.637 − 0.527 − 0.543 − 0.693 0.219 0.060
FRA 0.629 − 0.346 − 0.441 − 0.815 − 0.579 0.271 0.149
DEU 0.474 − 0.503 − 0.557 − 0.474 − 0.331 0.225 0.098
GBR 0.459 − 0.362 − 0.392 − 0.403 − 0.348 0.155 0.042
GRC 0.356 − 0.504 − 0.356 − 0.359 − 0.616 0.227 0.047
IRL 0.342 − 0.319 − 0.285 − 0.382 − 0.527 0.116 0.033
ITA 0.461 − 0.472 − 0.422 − 0.495 − 0.541 0.273 0.094
NLD 0.265 − 0.134 − 0.184 − 1.066 − 0.836 0.260 0.027
PRT 0.459 − 0.829 − 0.601 − 0.625 − 0.879 0.190 0.047
ESP 0.435 − 0.544 − 0.488 − 0.471 − 0.420 0.175 0.053
SWE 0.548 − 0.525 − 0.389 − 0.688 − 0.726 0.297 0.034
CZE 0.346 − 1.557 − 1.330 0.358 0.230 − 0.373 − 0.055
HUN 0.361 − 0.743 − 0.610 − 0.513 − 0.609 0.050 0.009
POL 0.299 − 0.872 − 0.709 0.018 − 0.052 − 0.016 − 0.011
SVK 0.272 − 1.798 − 1.480 0.248 0.212 − 0.817 − 0.153
SVN 0.342 − 1.238 − 0.843 0.272 − 0.155 − 0.267 − 0.003
REX 0.240 − 1.656 − 1.096 0.590 0.175 − 0.568 − 0.117
ROE 0.015 0.013 0.032 0.027 − 0.012 0.001
USA 0.016 0.009 0.041 0.027 − 0.012 0.001
AAT − 0.001 − 0.003 0.002 − 0.005
72Table D.4 Detailed country results for Scenario 3
TAXKQN LSINMP LSEXMP UNPDQN
LSL HSL LSL HSL LSL HSL
AUT 0.496 − 1.015 − 1.088 0.323 0.777 − 0.216 − 0.084
BLU 0.380 − 0.460 − 0.522 − 0.573 − 0.364 0.013 − 0.035
DNK 0.539 − 0.507 − 0.503 − 0.429 − 0.381 0.076 − 0.012
FIN 0.395 − 0.999 − 1.071 0.041 0.373 − 0.425 − 0.226
FRA 0.634 − 0.423 − 0.607 − 0.648 − 0.313 0.134 0.005
DEU 0.481 − 0.649 − 0.831 − 0.235 0.028 − 0.053 − 0.118
GBR 0.461 − 0.408 − 0.490 − 0.325 − 0.191 0.071 0.000
GRC 0.363 − 0.705 − 0.606 − 0.102 − 0.116 − 0.187 − 0.171
IRL 0.344 − 0.377 − 0.392 − 0.279 − 0.304 0.050 0.004
ITA 0.471 − 0.751 − 0.736 − 0.139 − 0.021 − 0.158 − 0.142
NLD 0.265 − 0.131 − 0.131 − 1.076 − 0.942 0.277 0.042
PRT 0.464 − 0.926 − 0.874 − 0.484 − 0.405 0.074 − 0.040
ESP 0.444 − 0.755 − 0.811 − 0.123 0.119 − 0.229 − 0.262
SWE 0.554 − 0.640 − 0.570 − 0.513 − 0.389 0.136 − 0.026
CZE 0.358 − 2.442 − 2.350 1.399 1.823 − 1.681 − 0.344
HUN 0.369 − 1.254 − 1.278 0.345 0.636 − 0.430 − 0.079
POL 0.316 − 1.574 − 1.372 0.668 0.997 − 1.844 − 0.431
SVK 0.287 − 2.999 − 2.607 1.077 1.820 − 3.714 − 0.757
SVN 0.346 − 1.281 − 1.193 0.312 0.392 − 0.440 − 0.125
REX 0.245 − 1.912 − 1.720 0.863 1.060 − 1.070 − 0.553
ROE 0.014 0.013 0.030 0.026 − 0.011 0.001
USA 0.015 0.009 0.039 0.025 − 0.012 0.001
AAT − 0.002 − 0.003 0.001 − 0.005
73Table D.5 Detailed country results for Scenario 4
TAXKQN LSINMP LSEXMP UNPDQN
LSL HSL LSL HSL LSL HSL
AUT 0.523 0.428 0.685 0.583 1.052 0.074 0.031
BLU 0.387 0.047 0.033 − 0.492 − 0.304 0.243 0.046
DNK 0.555 − 0.042 0.096 − 0.271 − 0.182 0.143 0.083
FIN 0.407 0.292 0.445 0.197 0.480 0.296 0.102
FRA 0.639 0.049 − 0.146 − 0.625 − 0.333 0.419 0.135
DEU 0.489 0.097 − 0.148 − 0.203 − 0.008 0.335 0.030
GBR 0.466 − 0.054 − 0.149 − 0.303 − 0.192 0.195 0.035
GRC 0.367 − 0.156 0.063 − 0.101 − 0.122 0.095 0.083
IRL 0.348 − 0.081 − 0.021 − 0.268 − 0.297 0.126 0.038
ITA 0.478 0.018 0.136 − 0.131 − 0.035 0.280 0.124
NLD 0.263 − 0.380 − 0.375 − 1.115 − 0.973 0.240 0.022
PRT 0.482 − 0.119 − 0.003 − 0.399 − 0.331 0.223 0.067
ESP 0.448 0.104 0.078 − 0.165 0.027 0.329 0.073
SWE 0.579 0.003 0.184 − 0.166 − 0.010 0.195 0.050
CZE 0.375 0.703 0.833 1.461 1.740 − 0.293 − 0.050
HUN 0.380 0.391 0.469 0.387 0.622 0.223 0.027
POL 0.313 0.252 0.259 0.439 0.544 0.184 0.006
SVK 0.285 0.401 0.532 0.731 0.934 0.138 0.031
SVN 0.358 0.117 0.141 0.281 0.314 0.090 0.032
REX 0.253 0.299 0.380 0.727 0.858 − 0.076 − 0.016
ROE 0.013 0.012 0.028 0.024 − 0.010 0.001
USA 0.015 0.008 0.037 0.023 − 0.011 0.001
AAT − 0.002 − 0.004 0.001 − 0.005
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